10 сентября 2012 года состоялся публичный научный семинар на котором с докладом "Олигополия с переменным уровнем конкурентной агрессивности" выступил Родольфо Дос Сантоса (BETA, университет Страсбурга).

Аннотация: Oligopolistic competition is usually apprehended, in particular in macroeconomic modelling, within the dichotomy opposing price competition and quantity competition. The talk presents a synthesis of several papers co-signed by the speaker, which go beyond that dichotomy and analyze price-quantity competition games. In the approach proposed by those papers, price (Bertrand) equilibria and quantity (Cournot) equilibria are just specific elements of the sets of equilibria of these games, which actually fill the whole space between perfect competition and tacit collusion. The approach leads to a natural parameterization of the equilibria, in terms of conduct parameters measuring the competitive aggressiveness of the competitors at each particular equilibrium. It completes the (static) theory of oligopolistic competition in both the homogeneous oligopoly and the differentiated oligopoly cases, by adding a behavioural dimension to the structural dimensions of concentration, substitutability within an industry and substitutability with respect to other industries, which together determine the competitors’ degrees of monopoly.